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BURRIS v. STATE: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONTINUED 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE FOR ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OF GANG EXPERTS 
MICHAEL JACKO∗ 
In Burris v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland asked whether it 
was appropriate to admit expert testimony on the culture and history of 
street gangs when doing so could explain why witnesses recanted their pre-
trial statements concerning the defendant’s involvement in a murder case.2  
Acknowledging the potentially inflammatory nature of alleged gang mem-
bership, the court applied the two-part rule for admitting expert testimony 
on gangs that it had previously adopted in Gutierrez v. State.3  It unani-
mously concluded that while there was adequate fact evidence connecting 
the murder to gang activity, the potential for unfair prejudice from the ex-
pert testimony outweighed its probative value.4  Therefore, the court held 
that the testimony should have been excluded.5  The court reached the nec-
essary conclusion, but it missed the opportunities to further clarify the cor-
rect application of the Gutierrez test, and to define when, if ever, expert tes-
timony could permissibly allege witness intimidation as an explanation for 
why a government witness might recant her pretrial statements.  First, the 
court should have explicitly included in its test a requirement that the pros-
ecution demonstrate the defendant’s gang affiliation by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.6  Second, it should have set forth a standard of proof required 
to establish a gang connection to a crime.7  Third, the court ought to have 
stipulated a requirement that prosecutors demonstrate the presence of wit-
ness intimidation before a court might permit an expert to describe patterns 
of witness intimidation generally.8  Failing to include such safeguards in the 
                                                          
© 2015 Michael Jacko. 
∗ J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2016; M.A., 
Philosophy, Fordham University, 2007.  The author thanks Professor Marc Desimone for recom-
mending the case and for his guidance throughout the writing process.  The author is also grateful 
for the helpful contributions of the Maryland Law Review staff who assisted in editing this Note.  
Finally, the author thanks his wife, Kate, for her patient support. 
 1.  435 Md. 370, 78 A.3d 371 (2013). 
 2.  Id. at 384, 78 A.3d at 379. 
 3.  Id. at 386, 78 A.3d at 381 (citing Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 481–82, 32 A.3d 2, 5 
(2011)). 
 4.  Id. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384. 
 5.  Id. at 397, 78 A.3d at 387. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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state’s jurisprudence concerning such potentially toxic evidence as a de-
fendant’s membership in a gang is to risk a significant curtailment of the 
right to a fair trial. 
I.  THE CASE 
On April 17, 2009, Shelton Burris was indicted in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City for the murder of Hubert Dickerson, Jr.9  Prior to trial, the 
State moved to introduce evidence pertaining to the history and organiza-
tion of the Black Guerilla Family (BGF) gang and to Burris’ involvement 
with that association, including expert testimony provided by Baltimore 
City Detective, Sgt. Dennis Workley.10  Over defense counsel’s objection, 
the court allowed the testimony based on the State’s argument that the mur-
der was a gang-ordered execution resulting from the victim’s failure to re-
pay a debt to “Bam,” a BGF boss, and thus that Burris’ role in the BGF 
provided motive for the killing.11 
At trial, the prosecution brought four different fact witnesses, each of 
whom either completely recanted his or her previous statements connecting 
Burris to the murder and to the BGF, or at least hesitated to reproduce such 
testimony in open court.12  The prosecution then brought to the stand Sgt. 
Workley, who testified as to the history and culture of the BGF and its ille-
gal activities within Maryland’s prison system, described Burris’ classifica-
tion as a member of the BGF by the Division of Corrections, and interpret-
ed Burris’ tattoos as evidence of self-identification with the BGF.13  The 
defense objected that all testimony concerning the BGF or Burris’ tattoos 
was irrelevant and prejudicial because there was no evidence marking the 
instant offense as a gang-related murder or identifying the perpetrator by his 
                                                          
 9.  Burris v. State, 206 Md. App. 89, 94, 47 A.3d 635, 638 (2012), rev’d, Burris v. State, 435 
Md. 370, 78 A.3d 371 (2013). 
 10.  Id. at 95, 47 A.3d at 638. 
 11.  Id. at 95–96, 47 A.3d at 638–39. 
 12.  Id. at 97–102, 47 A.3d at 640–42.  One witness, who previously told the police that he 
had heard Burris admit to killing a man and had heard Bam praise him for it, testified that he had 
lied in the interview because he feared the police would charge him for drug possession.  Id. at 
97–99, 47 A.3d at 640–41.  A second witness, who told police he had seen Burris shoot the victim, 
testified that he made the story up on Bam’s instruction.  Id. at 100–101, 47 A.3d at 641–42.  The 
third witness initially testified at trial that he had no recollection of discussing the murder with the 
police, but eventually stated that he had heard Burris confess to killing someone who owed Bam 
money.  Id. at 102, 47 A.3d at 642.  The fourth witness testified that she had been intoxicated dur-
ing the interview with police in which she claimed to have heard Burris confess to a murder.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 103–04, 47 A.3d at 642–43.  Specifically, Sgt. Workley commented on the follow-
ing tattoos: “Baltimore” and “Franklin” identify the territory in which Burris does business; the 
number 187 next to a picture of a gun represents the California Penal code for homicide; “OG” 
stands for “original gangster” and goes along with another tattoo, which reads “work real, real n---
- don’t die;” that images of weapons represent the concept in gang culture of “death before dis-
honor,” and “Sixx 9” is Burris’ street name.  Id. (altered from original). 
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tattoos.14  The court overruled these objections and admitted the testimony 
based on its observations that fact witnesses had recanted their statements 
prior to trial, that these witnesses had previously connected Burris to the 
BGF, and that Sgt. Workley’s expert testimony concerning the BGF ex-
plained why those witnesses might have changed their statements.15  The 
court further stated that jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice that 
Burris might suffer because of testimony connecting him to a street gang.16  
The jury convicted Burris of first-degree murder and of the use of a hand-
gun in the commission of a crime of violence.17 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals devised a test for admitting 
expert testimony to explain witness recantation, holding: 
[E]xpert testimony about the history, hierarchy, and common 
practices of a street gang is admissible where: (1) the evidence es-
tablishes that a witness has previously given information to law 
enforcement officers incriminating the defendant and the witness 
recants the information at trial, (2) the reason for the recantation 
is related to appellant’s membership in, or affiliation with, a gang, 
and (3) the probative value of the expert testimony is not substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defend-
ant.18 
Applying this rule to the facts at hand, the court quickly concluded that the 
first two of the above-enumerated conditions were met, i.e., (1) that wit-
nesses had undisputedly recanted their pretrial statements19 and (2) that two 
of those witnesses expressed that Burris’ BGF membership made them 
afraid to testify against him.20  As for the third condition, the court also 
concluded that the probative value of Sgt. Workley’s testimony was not 
outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice Burris.21  The court noted a 
number of factors demonstrating the probative value of this testimony, in-
cluding: (1) that three witnesses recanted their statements; (2) that Sgt. 
Workley’s opinion that Burris was a member of BGF added validity to 
statements made by other witnesses; (3) that Burris’ tattoos confirmed his 
self-identification as a gang member and connected him to the neighbor-
                                                          
 14.  Id. at 95, 104, 47 A.3d at 638, 643. 
 15.  Id. at 104–05, 47 A.3d at 643–44. 
 16.  Id. at 105, 47 A.3d at 644.  The eventual jury instructions read, in pertinent part: “The 
Defendant is not charged with a crime involving being a member of any gang.  Information about 
the Defendant’s involvement if any with a gang was allowed only for you to understand the rela-
tionship between the Defendant and other parties in this case.”  Id. at 106, 47 A.3d at 644. 
 17.  Id. at 93, 47 A.3d at 637. 
 18.  Id. at 126–27, 47 A.3d at 656–57 (citing Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 32 A.3d 2 
(2011)). 
 19.  Id. at 127, 47 A.3d at 657. 
 20.  Id. at 129, 47 A.3d at 658. 
 21.  Id. at 135–36, 47 A.3d at 662. 
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hood of the shooting; and (4) that the background information on the BGF 
explained why witnesses would fear Burris, why they described him as a hit 
man, and why Burris would obey the orders of “Bam,” a BGF boss.22  In 
light of that probative value, the court reasoned that potential prejudice to 
Burris was relatively limited because (1) Sgt. Workley never said that Bur-
ris actually intimidated witnesses, (2) he did not opine as to Burris’ position 
in the BGF, and (3) he never alleged Burris or the BGF committed any spe-
cific crimes.23  Furthermore, while Sgt. Workley did testify as to the Divi-
sion of Corrections’ classification of Burris, he avoided reference to Burris’ 
past convictions, or sentences.24 
Having thus described how the probative value of Sgt. Workley’s tes-
timony outweighed the danger it had to prejudice Burris, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admit-
ting said testimony.25  The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider 
whether the circuit court erred in admitting extensive gang-related evidence, 
particularly the testimony of an expert who explained why witnesses may 
have recanted prior statements.26 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
If admitted at trial, evidence of prior “bad acts” can have a tendency to 
lead a jury to convict a defendant on the basis of her general character as 
opposed to the evidence that the government presents concerning the crimi-
nal offense in question.27  Aware of this danger, Maryland courts have es-
tablished a three-step inquiry to determine whether bad acts evidence is 
admissible:  assessing the reason for admission, the strength of the connec-
tion between the defendant and the bad act in question, and the relative 
prejudicial risk and probative value of admitting the evidence.28  When the 
evidence in question is the testimony of a gang expert, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland has devised a more specific test, requiring 1) a connection be-
tween the gang activity and the crime in question and 2) a probative value 
of admitting the evidence that is not outweighed by its potential for preju-
                                                          
 22.  Id. at 131–35, 47 A.3d at 659–61. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 132–33, 47 A.3d at 660. 
 25.  Id. at 136, 47 A.3d at 662.  The Court of Special Appeals also considered two other 
grounds for appeal: the appropriateness of a “CSI-type” voir dire question and the admissibility of 
a recorded phone call between Burris and the girlfriend of one of the State’s witnesses.  On both 
grounds, the court upheld the circuit court’s rulings.  Id. at 136–45, 47 A.3d at 662–67. 
 26.  Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 384, 78 A.3d 371, 379 (2013). 
 27.  Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 407, 929 A.2d 157, 162 (2007); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 
669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976). 
 28.  See infra Part II.A. 
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dice.29  The court laid out this test for gang evidence in State v. Gutierrez, 
which provides a helpful exploration of how the test functions.30 
A.  The Maryland Rules of Evidence Restrict the Admissibility of “Bad 
Acts” Evidence That Carries with It a Danger of Unfairly 
Prejudicing the Defendant 
“[T]here are few principles of American criminal jurisprudence more 
universally accepted than the rule that evidence which tends to show that 
the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on 
trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.”31  Generally speaking, the 
key factor governing the admissibility of evidence is its relevance.32  Except 
where prohibited by constitution, statute, or rule, relevant evidence is ad-
missible, and “[e]vidence that is not relevant is [never] admissible.”33  Mar-
yland Rule of Evidence 5-403 provides one such prohibition, asserting that 
even if evidence is relevant, the trial court may exclude it whenever “its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of,” among other 
things, “unfair prejudice.”34  Rule 5-404(b) identifies one particular avenue 
of potential prejudice, namely: “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
including delinquent acts,” which is not admissible for the purpose of prov-
ing a defendant’s bad character.35  The term “bad acts evidence” refers to 
such evidence generally.36 
While it is not always clear whether something constitutes a “bad 
act,”37 the Court of Appeals has explained that “a bad act is an activity or 
                                                          
 29.  See infra Part II.B. 
 30.  See infra Part II.C. 
 31.  State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363, 369, 701 A.2d 389, 392 (1997) (quoting Cross v. State, 282 
Md. 468, 473, 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978)). 
 32.  See MD. R. 5-402. 
 33.  Id.  “Relevant evidence” means “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”  MD. R. 5-401. 
 34.  MD. R. 5-403. 
 35.  MD. R. 5-404(b). Courts reason that if jurors are presented with evidence that a defendant 
committed an unrelated bad action in the past, then there is a risk that they will conclude that the 
defendant is a “bad person,” and that either she was more likely to commit any given crime, or she 
should be convicted in the current litigation simply to punish her for being a bad person.  Wynn v. 
State, 351 Md. 307, 317, 718 A.2d 588, 593 (1998); Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 496, 597 A.2d 
956, 960 (1991).   
 36.  Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 489, 32 A.3d 2, 9–10 (2011).  
 37.  “The most obvious reason for not defining ‘bad acts’ is that many acts, in and of them-
selves, are not ‘bad.’”  Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 547, 735 A.2d 1061, 1071 (1999) (ex-
plaining that a given action often “cannot be said to be bad or good” until placed within the con-
text of a lawsuit).  Given the difficulty of such a definition, combined with the fact that the court’s 
primarily concern is not to exclude some type of evidence for its own sake, but rather to avoid the 
result of character assault, it is unsurprising that it has not prioritized a need to lay out a strict def-
inition of “wrongs.”  See Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 58, 665 A.2d 233, 237 (1995) (“[A]cts 
that may reflect negatively on the defendant’s character implicate the policies underlying the rule 
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conduct, not necessarily criminal, that tends to impugn or reflect adversely 
upon one’s character, taking into consideration the facts of the underlying 
lawsuit.”38  Courts should generally not admit such evidence because of the 
risk that it could encourage the jury to come to a guilty verdict even when 
unsupported by the facts of the case before it.39  The Court of Appeals has 
declared that the rule governing the admissibility of evidence of other bad 
acts should correctly be an “exclusionary” one.40  In other words, there is a 
presumption that such evidence is inadmissible except where an exception 
applies,41 and the burden a party must carry in order to win admittance of 
such evidence is significant.42 
The Court of Appeals interprets Rule 5-404(b), in combination with 
Rule 5-403, to imply a three-step analysis for the admission of bad acts evi-
dence (referred to at times as the Harris-Faulkner test).43  First, a court 
must inquire whether the state’s rationale for admitting the evidence would 
fall under a recognized exception to exclusion.44  Second, the State must be 
able to clearly and convincingly establish the basis for the bad act evidence 
in question.45  Finally, the probative value of the evidence must not be out-
weighed by any unfair prejudice that is likely to result from its admission.46 
                                                          
against other crimes evidence.” (citing E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 
§2:14 (1994)). 
 38.  Klauenberg, at 549, 735 A.2d at 1072. 
 39.  Neam v. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 189, 286 A.2d 540, 545 (1972) (“The natural and inevi-
table tendency of the tribunal—whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight to the vicious 
record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or 
to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.” 
(quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 194, at 646 (3d ed. 1940))). 
 40.  Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id., 597 A.2d at 962 (“The exclusionary form of the rule clearly serves to remind the 
bench and bar that, unlike most other evidence, this evidence carries with it heavy baggage that 
must be closely scrutinized before admissibility is warranted.”). 
 43.  Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 58–59, 665 A.2d 233, 237 (1995); see also Harris, 324 
Md. at 497–98, 597 A.2d at 960; State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634–35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 
(1989). 
 44.  State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 489, 947 A.2d 519, 539 (2008) (citing Wynn v. State, 
351 Md. 307, 317, 718 A.2d 588, 593 (1998)). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id., 947 A.2d 539–40. 
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1.  Step One in the Harris-Faulkner Test Is to Ask Whether the 
Evidence Under Consideration Fits into One of the Recognized 
Exceptions to the Rule Against Admitting Evidence of Prior Bad 
Acts 
The first step in the test for assessing the admissibility of bad acts evi-
dence is to determine whether it serves an approved purpose.47  Such a pur-
pose demonstrates that the evidence has “special relevance”—that is, it is 
“substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case and [not be] of-
fered” simply to prove criminal character.48  So what purposes are legiti-
mate?  Rule 5-404(b) offers a list of permissible justifications for admitting 
bad acts evidence, including “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident.”49  Essentially, this amounts to a list of possible contested is-
sues to which bad acts evidence might have “special relevance.”50  While 
admitting that this list of actions is not exclusive, the Court of Appeals ad-
heres fairly closely to it.51 
For example, in Harris v. State,52 in which the defendant was being 
tried for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, the Court of 
Appeals ruled it improper to admit evidence of his prior conviction for pos-
session with the intent to distribute heroin.53  “Tendency to commit similar 
crimes” is not one of the exceptions listed in Rule 5-404(b), and the court 
declined to find it a legitimate reason to introduce bad acts evidence.54 
                                                          
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Harris, 324 Md. at 497, 597 A.2d at 960.  This special relevance requirement involves 
two parts: 1) the relevance must be substantial, that is, not simply technically related to a formal 
element of the case; and 2) it must relate to an issue that is actually in dispute.  Emory v. State, 
101 Md. App. 585, 602, 647 A.2d 1243, 1252 (1994). 
 49.  MD. R. 5-404(b).  Collectively, these are often referred to as “the Ross factors.”  Along 
with the list eventually codified in MD. R. 5-404 (b), the court in Ross v. State, 267 Md. 664, 350 
A.2d 680 (1976), also acknowledged that  
[a]dditional exceptions have also been recognized: When the several offenses are so 
connected in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown without 
proving the other, and to show a passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations with 
the particular person concerned in the crime on trial, and to prove other like crimes by 
the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the 
accused. 
Id. at 669–70, 350 A.2d at 684 (citation omitted).  
 50.  See Harris, 324 Md. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961 (substituting a description of “special rele-
vance” for the list of approved exceptions). 
 51.  State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 489 n.12, 947 A.2d 519, 539 n.12 (2008). 
 52.  324 Md. 490, 597 A.2d 956 (1991). 
 53.  Id. at 504, 597 A.2d at 964. 
 54.  Id. at 502, 597 A.2d at 962 (“[T]o be admissible there must appear between the previous 
offense and that with which the defendant is charged some real connection other than the allega-
tion that the offenses have sprung from the same disposition.  We find no such real connection or 
special relevance here.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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2.  Step Two in the Harris-Faulkner Test Is for the Court to 
Determine Whether the Government May Clearly and 
Convincingly Demonstrate the Bad Acts Evidence in Question. 
Provided that the bad acts evidence in question does advance a legiti-
mate purpose, the court’s second step should be to determine whether the 
State is able to demonstrate the bad act through clear and convincing evi-
dence.55  Whether the State can meet this standard of proof is a decision be-
longing to the court,56 and typically requires the government to proffer its 
evidence outside of the presence of the jury.57  As for the requisite strength 
for evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard, the Court of Ap-
peals has held that it is not as demanding as a beyond a reasonable doubt 
requirement, but is greater than a preponderance of the evidence standard.58  
The evidence in question “should be ‘clear’ in the sense that it is certain, 
plain to the understanding, and unambiguous and ‘convincing’ in the sense 
that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you to believe it.”59  The 
Court of Appeals does not require that to be clear and convincing, evidence 
must “be established with absolute certainty,” and if the evidence is “to 
some degree conflicting,” that need not necessarily prevent a trial judge 
from finding that the standard is met.60  On review, an appellate court will 
not overturn the trial judge’s decision on the second prong of the Harris-
Faulkner test unless it is clearly erroneous.61 
                                                          
 55.  “Similar act” and other Rule 5-404(b) evidence may only be admitted “if there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act.”  
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (upholding the trial court’s admission of 
testimony regarding the defendant’s previous sales of stolen merchandise when his defense to 
knowingly possessing and selling stolen blank videocassettes was that he did not know they were 
stolen). 
 56.  Emory v. State, 101 Md. App. 585, 622, 647 A.2d 1243, 1262 (1994). 
 57.  Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 478 n.7, 386 A.2d 757, 764 n.7 (1978) (“The preferred 
method for submitting any evidence of other crimes to the court during trial would be by way of a 
proffer to the trial judge outside the presence or hearing of the jury.  Such a proffer not only pro-
tects the jury from immediate prejudice, but also allows the trial judge to determine whether there 
is any way to limit the prejudicial aspects of the evidence while retaining its probative character 
and whether the evidence should properly be introduced at that time.”). 
 58.  Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 470, 554 A.2d 1231, 1236 (1989). 
 59.  Id. at 470–71, 554 A.2d at 1237 (quoting THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, MARYLAND PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 1:8(b) (2d ed. 1984)). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Emory, 101 Md. App. at 622, 647 A.2d at 1262.  In Whittlesey v. State, the court set forth 
a narrow exception to the Harris-Faulkner test: “where the probative value of the evidence does 
not depend upon proof that the misconduct actually took place, the court should not apply the 
clear-and-convincing requirement in assessing the admissibility of the testimony.”  340 Md. 30, 
61, 665 A.2d 223, 238 (1995) (holding that even though the government positively disproved the 
defendant’s anecdote that he had frightened a woman by following her with a knife, and thus the 
content of that story failed under the second prong of Harris-Faulkner, the statement was still ad-
missible because it demonstrated the defendant’s willingness to lie in order to explain his wherea-
bouts at the time of the murder for which he stood trial). 
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In Cross v. State,62 a grand larceny case, the government presented ev-
idence that the defendant had also been involved in a burglary on the same 
day as the crime in question.63  In the burglary, which went uncharged, a 
witness identified a car at the scene, but other than a matching color and 
make, there was no evidence that the car belonged to the defendant (the 
witness provided a different license plate number) or that the defendant was 
present at the burglary crime scene.64  The government also presented evi-
dence that an empty beer bottle found at the scene matched the brand of a 
six-pack that the defendant bought earlier that day.65  On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals found for the defendant on the grounds that the State could not 
clearly and convincingly connect him to the prior bad act, the burglary.66  
Evidence of that act thus failed the second prong of the Harris-Faulkner 
test.67 
3.  The Third Step in the Harris-Faulkner Test Is to Weigh the 
Probative Value of the Bad Acts Evidence Against Its Potential 
to Prejudice the Defendant 
The final and most involved question of the Harris-Faulkner test is 
that the probative value of the evidence under consideration not be out-
weighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant.68  While Rule 
5-404(b) does provide a list of nine permissible reasons to admit bad acts 
evidence and only one impermissible reason,69 this numerical imbalance 
does not indicate that bad acts evidence is admissible more often than not.  
Rather, because Rule 5-404(b) must be read in the context of Rule 5-403, 
even when one submits bad acts evidence for a legitimate purpose, the court 
still must weigh the evidence’s probative value against its potential for cre-
ating unfair prejudice.70 
                                                          
 62.  282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978). 
 63.  Id. at 469–71, 386 A.2d at 759–60. 
 64.  Id. at 479, 386 A.2d at 764. 
 65.  Id. at 479–80, 386 A.2d at 764. 
 66.  Id at 479, 386 A.2d at 764 (“In this case, one would be hard put to urge that the evidence 
of the petitioner’s involvement in the . . . break-in was ‘clear and convincing’; in fact, it was so 
deficient that it would not even suffice to create a jury issue were [the petitioner] being tried for 
any crime associated with [that] incident.”). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 489, 947 A.2d 519, 539–40 (2008). 
 69.  See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 70.  The Advisory Committee’s Note to the Federal Rule of Evidence on which MD. R. 5-
404(b) is based supports this reading: “The determination must be made whether the danger of 
undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other 
means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.”  
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note subdiv. b. 
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The kind of unfair prejudice that would outweigh probative value “in-
volves more than damage to the opponent’s cause.”71  Rather, unfair preju-
dice refers to something that makes the jury lose its objectivity or disregard 
the weight of the evidence presented.72  Thus, probative value is out-
weighed by the risk of unfair prejudice when the evidence encourages ju-
rors to make a primarily emotional response as opposed to a rational one.73  
When the evidence is sufficiently probative, it is more likely to appeal to 
the jury’s rationality, and thus, any prejudice resulting from its admission is 
appropriate rather than unfair.74  The Court of Appeals has implied that the 
potential prejudicial value of bad acts evidence is so significant that there is 
essentially a rebuttable presumption that such evidence is inadmissible.75 
The relative weight of the probative versus prejudicial value of evi-
dence of prior bad acts was critical to its admissibility in Odum v. State.76  
There, the defendant was initially charged, along with four co-defendants, 
with the armed robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, and murder of two vic-
tims.77  “The jury acquitted him of all charges save for two counts of kid-
napping.”78  On appeal, the defendant won a new trial on the kidnapping 
counts, and on retrial he unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of his 
involvement in the robbery, carjacking, and murder that accompanied the 
kidnapping.79  After determining that the offenses were so closely connect-
ed with the kidnappings as to form one crime, the Court of Appeals ruled 
that “[a]lthough the evidence surely prejudiced Petitioner, we are not per-
suaded that it unfairly prejudiced him, much less that the prejudice ‘sub-
stantially outweighed’ the probative value of the evidence.”80 
Even though there is a strong presumption against the admissibility of 
prior bad acts evidence,81 the prosecution may overcome that presumption 
provided that it can meet the requirements of the Harris-Faulkner test.82  In 
                                                          
 71.  State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 102, 517 A.2d 741, 747–48 (1986). 
 72.  Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 615, 989 A.2d 232, 245 (2010) (quoting LYNN MCLAIN, 
MARYLAND EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL § 403:1(b) (2d ed. 2001)) (“[E]vidence may be un-
fairly prejudicial ‘if it might influence the jury to disregard the evidence or lack of evidence re-
garding the particular crime with which [the defendant] is being charged.’”). 
 73.  Id. (quoting JOSEPH F. MURPHY JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 
§ 506(B) (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2007)). 
 74.  Id. (“The more probative the evidence is of the crime charged, the less likely it is that the 
evidence will be unfairly prejudicial.”). 
 75.  Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991) (indicating that bad acts 
evidence ought generally to be excluded, except when it has special relevance to some contested 
issue, and its probative force “substantially outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”). 
 76.  412 Md. 593, 989 A.2d 232 (2010). 
 77.  Id. at 596, 989 A.2d at 234. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 596–600, 989 A.2d at 234–36.  
 80.  Id. at 615, 989 A.2d at 245. 
 81.  Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991). 
 82.  State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634–35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989). 
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practice, however, this test requires some adjustments in order to apply to 
various types of bad acts evidence. 
B.  Details Relating to a Defendant’s Involvement in a Street Gang Are 
a Particular Form of Bad Acts Evidence That Some Courts Have 
Found to Require Special Consideration 
The Burris court faced a problem of how to deal with a particular sort 
of bad acts evidence, namely: expert testimony pertaining to a defendant’s 
involvement in a street gang.  Membership in a gang does not obviously fall 
under the statutory categorization of “other crimes, wrongs, or . . . delin-
quent acts,”83 but it fits more clearly under the Court of Appeals’ definition 
of bad acts evidence as “activity or conduct, not necessarily criminal, that 
tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one’s character, taking into con-
sideration the facts of the underlying lawsuit.”84  Therefore, Maryland 
courts have treated a defendant’s gang involvement as a bad act for the pur-
pose of making decisions on the admissibility of evidence.85 
In many jurisdictions, courts conclude that evidence relating to a de-
fendant’s membership in a gang, like that of other bad acts, may be admis-
sible for a purpose such as identification, proof of motive, or other reasons 
similar to those listed in Maryland’s Rule 5-404(b).86  Such purposes 
                                                          
 83.  MD. R. 5-404(b). 
 84.  Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 549, 735 A.2d 1061, 1072 (1999); see also James 
Blake Sibley, Gang Violence: Response of the Criminal Justice System to the Growing Threat, 11 
CRIM. JUST. J. 403, 411 (1989) (“[A]ny attempt to use . . . information [related to gang member-
ship] as character evidence must be avoided.”). 
 85.  Ayala v. State, 174 Md. App. 647, 658, 923 A.2d 952, 958 (2007) (“There can be little 
doubt that evidence that a defendant is a member of an organization known for violent acts may be 
evidence of bad character or prior bad acts.”).  Many jurisdictions with similar rules have similarly 
found that evidence of a defendant’s gang involvement should be governed under rules for admit-
ting bad acts evidence.  See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Accused’s 
Membership in Gang, 39 A.L.R. 4TH 775 (2010) (surveying jurisdictions and concluding that 
“[w]hile commonly recognizing that evidence identifying a defendant as a member of a gang may 
be prejudicial, since juries may associate such groups with criminal activity and improperly con-
vict on the basis of inferences as to the defendant’s character, many courts have held that such 
evidence may nevertheless be admissible if it is sufficiently relevant to a proper issue in the case, 
weighing this probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice”). 
 86.  Theuman, supra note 85 (“Gang membership has frequently been found to be probative 
and admissible, for example, as evidence of a possible motive for the crime, particularly in homi-
cide cases where the defendant and his victim are shown to have been members of rival gangs; as 
an indication of possible bias on the part of defense witnesses who are shown to be members of 
the defendant’s gang; as evidence of a common design or purpose in crimes committed by a 
group; or as bolstering the identification of the defendant, such as in cases where witnesses de-
scribe the perpetrators as having worn gang colors.”); see also People v. Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d 524, 
541 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“Gang-related evidence is admissible to show common purpose or de-
sign, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act.  Gang-related evidence is also rele-
vant to identification or to corroborate a defendant’s confession.”(citations omitted)). 
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demonstrate special relevance.87  Evidence of gang involvement is inadmis-
sible, however, when it is not relevant to a contested issue in the case.88 
The Court of Appeals first confronted the question of whether to admit 
expert testimony on gangs in Gutierrez v. State.89  There, it devised a two-
part test to govern the admissibility of expert testimony on gangs.90  First, a 
court must ask whether there is evidence connecting the crime to gang ac-
tivity, and second, it must inquire whether the probative value of such tes-
timony is outweighed by the potential unfair prejudice of admitting it.91 
1.  Courts Should Only Consider the Admission of Expert 
Testimony on Gangs When Such Evidence Bears a Connection 
to the Crime Charged 
The Court of Appeals has held that in the case of expert testimony as 
to the workings of a gang, the threshold requirement is fact evidence that 
the crime was gang-related.92  Once the government makes such a showing, 
the defendant’s gang membership goes from being “an impermissible prior 
bad act to a concrete component of the crime for which the defendant is on 
trial.”93  The requirement of demonstrating a connection between gang-
related activity and the crime serves the same function as Rule 5-404(b)’s 
list of exceptions to the exclusion of bad acts evidence in general, that is, 
both force the prosecution to show that the evidence has special relevance 
to the trial.94 
                                                          
 87.  Theuman, supra note 85 (“[M]any courts have held that [evidence of gang membership] 
may nevertheless be admissible if it is sufficiently relevant to a proper issue in the case, weighing 
this probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice.”); see also supra Part II.A.1. 
 88.  See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 496, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (2011) (“Proof of . . . a link 
[between gang activity and the crime in question] transforms a defendant’s gang membership, cur-
rent or prospective, from an impermissible prior bad act to a concrete component of the crime for 
which the defendant is on trial.”); Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d at 541 (“Testimony regarding the back-
ground, history and criminal activity of the gangs is improper if peripheral to the offense at is-
sue.”). 
 89.  See Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 490–95, 32 A.3d at 10–13 (summarizing the practice adopted 
by courts in other jurisdictions as well as that of the Court of Special Appeals, but making no ref-
erence to any decisions by the Court of Appeals). 
 90.  The Court of Appeals does not explain how the Gutierrez test fits with the Harris-
Faulkner test described in Part II.A.  For more discussion on how the two might be reconciled, see 
infra Part IV.A. 
 91.  Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 496–98, 32 A.3d at 13–15. 
 92.  Id. at 496, A.3d at 13.   
 93.  Id.  In requiring that evidence of a gang connection be established by fact evidence before 
expert testimony on the subject is admissible, the Maryland Court of Appeals explicitly sided with 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico’s decision in State v. Torrez, 210 P.3d 228 (N.M. 2009), rather 
than with the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Ayala v State, 174 Md. App. 647, 
923 A.2d 952 (2007), which claimed that the State did not need to present evidence that a crime 
was gang-related when it could show that the defendant was a member of the gang and that such 
membership created a plausible motive for the crime.  Id. at 496 & n.2, 32 A.3d at 13–14 & n.2. 
 94.  See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
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A prosecutor might seek to admit testimony concerning gangs as a 
means of explaining why a defendant would commit a crime.95  For exam-
ple, prior to trial in Ayala v. State,96 the defendant in a murder case admitted 
to police that he was a member of one gang and that he believed the victim 
to have belonged to a rival gang, members of which had recently beaten 
him.97  The Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to 
admit the testimony of a gang expert who spoke, among other things, about 
the importance in gang culture of “getting at” members of a rival gang and 
the discipline a member could face for failing to “represent” his gang.98 
Another common reason for prosecutors to submit gang-related evi-
dence is to explain why witnesses might have recanted their previous state-
ments to the police.  Prior to Burris, no Maryland court had addressed the 
use of expert testimony to explain witness recantation, but several other ju-
risdictions have.99  In People v. Gonzalez,100 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that the testimony of a gang expert concerning a culture of witness 
intimidation might be relevant to assess the credibility of a witness who re-
pudiated at trial his previous statements to police.101  The court reasoned 
that “[w]hether members of a street gang would intimidate persons who tes-
tify against a member of that or a rival gang is sufficiently beyond common 
experience that a court could reasonably believe expert opinion would assist 
the jury.”102  Similarly, in People v. Dixon,103 the Appellate Court of Illinois 
held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gang-
related evidence for the purpose of explaining the witnesses’ change of 
heart at trial.”104  In that case, the court declined to narrow the parameters of 
relevance surrounding a gang expert’s testimony.  For example, the witness 
need not belong to the gang in order for evidence of intimidation to be rele-
vant because “a gang may inspire fear in non-members as well as its own 
members.”105  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the issue regarding fear 
of retaliation is one of the witness’s state of mind rather than gang mem-
bers’ deliberate choice to intimidate.106  Finally, the court held that the de-
                                                          
 95.  Establishing motive is one of the acceptable reasons to admit bad acts evidence.  MD. R. 
5-404(b). 
 96.  174 Md. App. 647, 923 A.2d 952 (2007). 
 97.  Id. at 653–54, 923 A.2d at 955–56. 
 98.  Id. at 655, 665–66, 923 A.2d at 956, 962–63. 
 99.  Burris v. State, 206 Md. App. 89, 125–26, 47 A.3d 635, 656 (2012) rev’d, 435 Md. 370, 
78 A.3d 371 (2013). 
 100.  135 P.3d 649 (Cal. 2006). 
 101.  Id. at 657–58. 
 102.  Id. at 657. 
 103.  882 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
 104.  Id. at 681. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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fendant need not be aware of the witness intimidation for evidence thereof 
to be relevant.107 
Some jurists argue, however, that merely providing a possible explana-
tion for why witnesses would recant their previous statements is not, on its 
own, sufficient to admit a gang expert’s testimony concerning witness in-
timidation.  In People v. Tolliver,108 the Appellate Court of Illinois consid-
ered a case in which, at trial, six eyewitnesses recanted their prior state-
ments implicating the defendant in the shooting death of a plainclothes 
police officer.109  To explain those recantations, the trial court admitted tes-
timony by an expert regarding punishments that gangs carry out against 
those who witness against their members.110  While the appellate court af-
firmed the trial court’s decision,111 the presiding judge on the panel dissent-
ed, expressing concern that the prosecution failed to present any evidence 
that the witnesses had, in fact, been intimidated.112 
2.  Even If Gang-Related Expert Testimony Is Relevant to the 
Crime, the Court Should Only Admit It into Evidence When Its 
Probative Value Is Not Outweighed by the Potential Unfair 
Prejudice That Will Result 
The second prong of the Gutierrez test for the admissibility of expert 
testimony concerning gangs, to balance the probative versus prejudicial 
value of the testimony, is a direct carry-over from the Harris-Faulkner test 
for admitting bad acts evidence in general, and from Rule 5-403.113  The po-
tential for prejudice with respect to gang-related testimony is very real.114  
Because citizens associate gangs with crime, identifying a defendant as a 
gang member introduces the risk that a jury will convict based on his pre-
sumably bad character regardless of the evidence presented against him.115  
Therefore, courts may exclude evidence when it is probative to no contested 
issue or only a minor one or when the same point could have been made 
with evidence that is less prejudicial.116 
                                                          
 107.  Id. 
 108.  807 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. App. Ct., 2004). 
 109.  Id. at 531–33. 
 110.  Id. at 530. 
 111.  Id. at 542. 
 112.  Id. at 556 (Campbell, P.J., dissenting in part).  There was also concern that the witnesses’ 
prior statements might have been involuntary by reason of police coercion, and therefore improp-
erly admitted.  Id. at 555. 
 113.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 114.  Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 495, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (2011) (“[W]e remain ever-cognizant 
of the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the possibility that a jury may determine 
guilt by association rather than by its belief that the defendant committed the criminal acts.”). 
 115.  Theuman, supra note 85 (“[J]uries may associate [gangs] with criminal activity and im-
properly convict on the basis of inferences as to the defendant’s character[.]”). 
 116.  Id. 
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C.  After Adapting the Harris-Faulkner Test to the Unique 
Circumstances of Expert Testimony Concerning Street Gangs, the 
Court of Appeals in Gutierrez v. State Affirmed the Lower Court’s 
Decision to Admit Such Testimony in That Case 
The facts of Gutierrez v. State,117 the case in which the Court of Ap-
peals devised the above-described test, provide a useful illustration of how 
the court intended it to be applied.  In Gutierrez, the defendant was on trial 
for murder.118  According to witnesses, the victim was standing with a 
group when a car drove up, and a passenger shouted, “Mara Sal-
vatrucha!”119  One person in the group responded by insulting the gang MS-
13, upon which the passenger opened fire, killing the victim.120  Eventually, 
witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter.121 
At trial, after several pieces of evidence tied the defendant and the 
murder to MS-13, a detective testified concerning a variety of elements of 
that gang’s history and culture.122  He explained the process of “jumping 
in,” by which one can earn admission to the gang, and that the location of 
the shooting was within the territory of Mexican gangs, considered rivals to 
MS-13.123  He went on to portray how gangs encourage their members to 
respond violently both to criticism of and to false identification with their 
gang (“false-flagging”).124  Furthermore, he described how the defendant 
identified himself with MS-13 through his MySpace page.125  The expert 
also opined that MS-13 was the gang from which law enforcement had seen 
the most violence in the previous four to five years.126 
After setting forth the legal background concerning the admissibility 
of prior bad acts in general, and the Harris-Faulkner test specifically,127 the 
Court of Appeals announced that the threshold requirement for the admissi-
bility of gang-related expert testimony is that there be sufficient fact evi-
dence establishing a connection between the gang and the crime.128  The 
court found that there was sufficient evidence to connect the murder to gang 
activity in this case for two reasons.  First, several witnesses testified to 
hearing the shooter exclaim “Mara Salvatrucha,” an MS-13 slogan, and 
                                                          
 117.  423 Md. 476, 32 A.3d 2 (2011). 
 118.  Id. at 482, 32 A.3d at 5. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id., 32 A.3d at 5–6. 
 121.  Id. at 483, 32 A.3d at 6. 
 122.  Id. at 484, 32 A.3d at 6. 
 123.  Id.  “Jumping in” is a ritual of induction in which a prospective member is beaten by a 
group of current members.  Id. at 8. 
 124.  Id. at 484, 32 A.3d at 7. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 489–91, 32 A.3d at 9–10; see also supra Part II.A. 
 128.  Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 496, 32 A.3d at 13. 
  
68 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 74:53 
hearing someone respond by insulting that gang before the shooter opened 
fire.129  Furthermore, another witness stepped forward claiming to have 
been a passenger in the car and acknowledged that the defendant fired into 
the crowd as a means of gaining membership to MS-13.130 
The court next indicated that the second element of the test is to evalu-
ate the expert’s testimony to determine whether its probative value is not 
outweighed by the risk of unfairly prejudicing the defendant.131  First, as to 
the danger of unfair prejudice, the court pledged to “remain ever-cognizant 
of the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the possibility that a 
jury may determine guilt by association rather than by its belief that the de-
fendant committed the criminal acts.”132  As to the probative value of the 
testimony, the court found that four out of five of the expert’s statements to 
which the defense objected directly helped to explain some element of the 
crime.133  The description of the gang’s name explained the gunman’s 
words at the time of the shooting; the description of “jumping in” supported 
testimony that the shooting was an attempt to join the gang; the explanation 
of how gang members respond to insults with punishment “up to death” 
helped make sense of the seemingly disproportionate brutality of the act; 
and the statement concerning reactions to “false flagging” illustrated how 
important the sense of exclusivity and hierarchy are to gang members.134  In 
light of the significant probative value of the evidence and the relatively 
weak risk of unfair prejudice, the court said that these statements were 
properly admitted.135  The only statement that the court found to be errone-
ously admitted was the detective’s identification of MS-13 as the gang from 
which local police had seen the most violence in recent years.136  This 
statement did not help the jury to understand why the defendant was the 
person who committed the crime, and thus held no probative value.137  The 
court, however, found this to be harmless error in that the statement was un-
likely to have made the jury arrive at a guilty verdict if it was not already 
prepared to do so.138 
Dissenting, Chief Judge Bell argued that while the court adopted the 
correct test, the expert testimony in the case did not pass either its first or its 
second step.139  First, Chief Judge Bell argued that the expert testimony 
                                                          
 129.  Id. at 497, 32 A.3d at 14. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 497–98, 32 A.3d at 14–15. 
 132.  Id. at 495, 32 A.3d at 13. 
 133.  Id. at 498–99, 32 A.3d at 15. 
 134.  Id. at 499, 32 A.3d at 15. 
 135.  Id., 32 A.3d at 15–16. 
 136.  Id., 32 A.3d at 16. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 499–500, 32 A.3d at 16. 
 139.  Id. at 501, 32 A.3d at 17 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). 
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failed the relevancy prong of the analysis in that the prosecution had no 
need to demonstrate motive as it was not an element of the charged offense 
of murder,140 nor did the defendant adopt a defense, for example, self-
defense, that would challenge the presence of motive.141  Because motive 
was not relevant to a contested issue, the expert’s testimony was distin-
guishable from other cases in which such testimony was permitted, claimed 
Chief Judge Bell.142  However, the Chief Judge did not stop there: not only 
were the expert’s statements irrelevant, but because the risk of unfair preju-
dice from admitting such evidence far outweighed its potential probative 
value, the evidence failed to meet the test’s second prong as well.143  The 
probative value was diminished, he said, because through their testimony, 
fact witnesses had already established a connection between the defendant, 
the gang, and the shooting.144  Therefore, the expert testimony had little to 
add.145  Moreover, the potential for unfair prejudice was significant when a 
police officer aligned the defendant with a group he described as extremely 
violent.146  Accordingly, the Chief Judge believed that the expert’s testimo-
ny met neither prong of the test for admissibility and thus would have re-
versed the trial court’s decision.147 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Burris v. State,148 the Court of Appeals of Maryland unanimously 
declined to follow the intermediate court’s focus on witness recantation.149  
Instead, it applied the Gutierrez test and held that testimony regarding the 
defendant’s involvement in gang activity was not admissible under the in-
                                                          
 140.  See id. at 506, 32 A.3d at 19 (recalling that “other crimes” evidence is only admissible 
when it “is substantially relevant to some contested issue and is not offered simply to prove crimi-
nal character.” (quoting State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 488, 947 A.2d 519, 539 (2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))). 
 141.  Id. at 507, 32 A.3d at 20 (“[E]vidence of motive ‘serves no legitimate purpose,’ and is 
therefore not material, when motive is not an essential element of any offense charged and when 
the prosecution is aware that it will not be contested.” (quoting Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 
254–55, 389 A.2d 1374, 1377–78 (1978))). 
 142.  Id. at 512–13, 32 A.3d at 23–24. 
 143.  Id. at 518, 32 A.3d at 27. 
 144.  Id. at 519, 32 A.3d at 27. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 519, 32 A.3d at 28. 
 147.  Id. at 501, 512–14, 519, 32 A.3d at 17, 24–25, 28.  In a portion of his dissenting opinion 
in which Judge Greene also joined, Chief Judge Bell also disputed the court’s conclusion that the 
admission of the statement identifying MS-13 as the most violent gang in the area represented 
harmless error.  Id. at 520–23, 32 A.3d at 28–30. 
 148.  435 Md. 370, 78 A.3d 371 (2013). 
 149.  Id. at 397, 78 A.3d at 387. 
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stant conditions,150 thus reversing the Court of Special Appeals’ judg-
ment.151 
The Court of Appeals explained that under the facts in Burris, the two-
step Gutierrez test for admitting expert testimony as to gang culture and the 
defendant’s membership in a gang ought to control.152  Again, in the first 
step of this analysis, a court must ask whether there is sufficient fact evi-
dence to support a nexus between a defendant’s alleged gang membership 
and the crime in question.153  Applying this threshold requirement, the court 
agreed that the evidence in the instant case was sufficient to tie the crime to 
Burris’ gang membership.154  Witness statements provided a basis to argue 
that Burris was a gang member, and that his alleged position in the gang 
relative to Bam (hit man to boss) established a nexus between the offense 
and his membership.155 
Having satisfied itself that this first requirement was met, the court 
proceeded to ask whether it should nonetheless exclude the expert testimo-
ny because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.156  Here, the court held that the probative value of Sgt. 
Workley’s testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.157  The tes-
timony concerning the violent, criminal nature of the BGF “was prejudicial 
to Burris because of its negative implication regarding Burris’s character,” 
and the testimony concerning the BGF’s illegal activities within prisons 
was not probative because the crime at issue did not involve a prison.158  
Also, statements describing the violent imagery of Burris’ tattoos and the 
connection of such imagery to prison culture invited the jury to make infer-
ences regarding his propensity to kill as well as to his history of incarcera-
tion.159  Furthermore, to the extent that Sgt. Workley’s testimony identified 
Burris as a BGF member, it was cumulative of the evidence presented by 
the other witnesses and was therefore not probative.160  Finally, Sgt. Work-
                                                          
 150.  Id. at 390–97, 78 A.3d at 383–87.  
 151.  Id. at 397, 78 A.3d at 387. 
 152.  Id. at 390, 78 A.3d at 383; see supra Part II.B. 
 153.  Burris, 435 Md. at 390, 78 A.3d at 383; see supra Part II.B.1.  The court clarified that 
while the gang connection to the crime ought to determine whether gang membership has become 
a component of the crime (as opposed to evidence of a prior bad act), the defendant need not be 
charged with a “gang crime” to meet this requirement.  Burris, 435 Md. at 391, 78 A.3d at 384. 
 154.  Id. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.; see supra Part II.B.2.  The court clarified that “evidence is considered unfairly preju-
dicial when it might influence the jury to disregard the evidence or lack of evidence regarding the 
particular crime with which [the defendant] is being charged.” Burris, 435 Md. at 392, 78 A.3d at 
384 (quoting Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 615, 989 A.2d 232, 245 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 157.  Burris, 435 Md. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384. 
 158.  Id. at 394, 78 A.3d at 385. 
 159.  Id. at 394–95, 78 A.3d at 385–86. 
 160.  Id. 395–96, 78 A.3d at 386. 
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ley’s testimony did not link the murder to debt collection, nor did it estab-
lish that a BGF “hit man” would play a role in extortion, nor did it show 
how Burris’ gang membership would explain witness recantation.161 
Given the above analysis, the court determined that the unfair preju-
dice generated by Sgt. Workley’s testimony outweighed its probative val-
ue.162  Accordingly, it held that the trial court erred in allowing said testi-
mony and therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial.163 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Burris, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the Gutierrez test to 
determine that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence.  However, 
it missed an opportunity to establish a precedent that would enable more 
just and consistent results in the future concerning the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony regarding street gangs.  The court could have done so if it 
had enhanced its decision in three principle ways.  Part IV.A will discuss 
why the court ought to have explicitly retained the Harris-Faulkner test’s 
requirement that the prosecution demonstrate the defendant’s gang mem-
bership by clear and convincing evidence.  Part IV.B will discuss the desir-
ability of specifying a standard of proof for the threshold requirement of ev-
idence connecting the crime with gang activity.  Part IV.C will propose that 
for an expert to testify about specific gang behaviors such as witness intim-
idation, the prosecution must first present evidence that such behaviors ac-
tually occurred in connection to the instant case. 
A.  While the Gutierrez Rule Provides the Correct Guidance in That 
Case as Well as in Burris, It Lacks the Protections Granted by the 
Second Element of the Harris-Faulkner Test 
Both the Gutierrez and the Burris courts cited the Harris-Faulkner test 
for the admission of bad acts evidence.164  The Gutierrez court then went on 
to create a more specific, two-step rule to apply to the admission of expert 
testimony on the history, organization, and customs of street gangs,165 a rule 
that the Burris court later cited.166  Mysteriously lost in the process was the 
second step of the Harris-Faulkner test, requiring a party seeking its admis-
sion to establish bad acts evidence clearly and convincingly.167  While pros-
ecutors could easily satisfy that prerequisite under the facts in both 
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Gutierrez and Burris, this requirement could provide an important protec-
tion to defendants in future cases.  Therefore, the court should not discard 
it. 
The Gutierrez and the Harris-Faulkner tests substantially overlap one 
another.168  Step one of the Gutierrez test fulfills the same purpose as step 
one of the Harris-Faulkner test, that is, both function to ensure that the evi-
dence has “special relevance” to a contested issue.169  Step two of the 
Gutierrez test is identical to step three of the Harris-Faulkner test.170  
Without explicitly stating why, the court has neglected step two of the Har-
ris-Faulkner test for the admission of bad acts evidence. 
In Gutierrez, the State brought ample evidence that the defendant was 
a member of MS-13, including photographs from his MySpace page depict-
ing him making identifiable MS-13 hand gestures, and testimony by the 
driver in the incident that the defendant’s reason for shooting the victim 
was to gain entry into the gang.171  Similarly, in Burris, two fact witnesses 
made statements to police that Burris was a member of BGF, and the prose-
cution’s expert interpreted photographs of his tattoos to indicate the same 
conclusion.172  Thus, in both cases, the prosecution could demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that the prior bad act it sought to admit (that 
is, membership in a gang) actually applied.  In other words, the evidence 
satisfied the second step in the Harris-Faulkner test. 
One could, however, imagine facts satisfying both steps of the 
Gutierrez test, but where the prosecution is unable to clearly and convinc-
ingly show that the defendant is a member of a gang, which would be re-
quired under the Harris-Faulkner line of cases.  In such a situation, the de-
fendant would face all of the prejudice that would come with gang 
involvement without the court being certain that he is a gang member.  For 
instance, assume a hypothetical situation similar to the facts of Gutierrez: 
there is a drive-by shooting where the gunman shouts a gang slogan, the 
victim or someone in the victim’s vicinity counters by insulting the gang, 
and both the defendant and a vehicle to which he has access match descrip-
tions from witnesses to the crime.  However, to depart from the facts in 
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Gutierrez, assume further that any evidence that the defendant is a member 
of the gang fails to meet the clear and convincing standard: perhaps he so-
cializes with known gang members, but he has no gang-related tattoos; po-
lice records reveal no known gang affiliation; and the state produces no 
witnesses who will testify to his involvement in a gang.173  The shouted 
declarations for and against the gang would support a claim by the prosecu-
tion that there is evidence that the crime was gang-related, and it is possible 
that a court would still assess the probative value not to be outweighed by 
prejudice were a gang expert to testify as to gang-related motives for the 
crime.174  However, a defendant in this situation needs and deserves the 
protection of a rule demanding that the prosecution clearly and convincing-
ly show a connection between the defendant and the gang as well as be-
tween the gang and the crime.175  Without such protection, a government 
expert would be able to discuss gang culture as it pertains to the crime, stir-
ring up fears and negative associations in the minds of jurors, without ever 
demonstrating that gang culture connects the defendant to the crime.  Cer-
tainly, such a defendant would still be able to argue against introduction of 
this evidence under the Harris-Faulkner precedent, but it would be clearer 
if the specific rule for admitting testimony by a gang expert explicitly in-
cluded this requirement. 
B.  The Court Ought to Have Specified a Minimum Standard for the 
Evidence of Gang-Connection Because, as in Burris, the Facts May 
Only Establish a Tenuous Connection Between the Crime and Gang 
Activity. 
The first step in the Gutierrez test, the determination whether fact evi-
dence provided sufficient connection between the crime in question and 
gang activity,176 is necessary but is incomplete until case law establishes the 
standard of proof that the prosecution must meet in order to satisfy that re-
quirement.  The court held that testimony by fact witnesses gave evidence 
to such a connection both in Gutierrez and in Burris.  However, the connec-
tion in the latter case is less clear-cut than in the first, which raises the ques-
tion: what is the minimum standard of proof that is acceptable in similar 
cases?  Because the Harris-Faulkner test requires a clear and convincing 
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showing that a defendant committed a prior bad act,177 the court would 
achieve some sense of symmetry were it to require the same standard to es-
tablish a gang connection to a crime.  But specifying any standard would be 
preferable to leaving defendants in the dark as they weigh their trial strate-
gies and judges free to make inconsistent rulings on whether the State car-
ried its burden of establishing a connection. 
In concluding that there was ample evidence establishing a gang con-
nection to the murder in question, the Gutierrez court referred to the sworn 
testimony of witnesses to the murder.  First, one witness, who admitted to 
driving the car from which the shooter fired, acknowledged that the defend-
ant perpetrated the attack in order to gain admission into MS-13.178  Also, 
multiple witnesses testified that the gunman shouted a known MS-13 slo-
gan, “Mara Salvatrucha!”179  This factual evidence convinced the Gutierrez 
court that there was a gang connection to the murder, and thus, that the 
prosecution satisfied the test’s first requirement.180  Whether the appropriate 
standard is clear-and-convincing or a simple preponderance of the evidence, 
the government certainly met its burden.  In fact, it might have proven its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Burris court likewise found that the facts of that case evidenced a 
gang connection.181  Specifically, the court referred to pre-trial statements 
of witnesses that: 
Burris and Bam were BGF members; Bam was a “boss” within 
the organization; Burris was a “hit man for real” for Bam who 
was told by Bam to commit the killing; that Bam, apparently, re-
sponded to Burris’s telling him that he “just killed a boy,” by stat-
ing “[t]hat’s my boy, straight G[ue]rilla”; and Burris was over-
heard stating that he committed a murder because the victim 
owed Bam money.182 
While the quoted summary by the Burris court at first sounds like a con-
vincing argument for a gang connection to the murder, there are several rea-
sons for which one might hesitate to reach that conclusion.  Most critically, 
all of the fact evidence cited by the court came from pre-trial statements 
that witnesses later recanted, rendering the connection less reliable than it 
would have been if supported by consistent, sworn testimony.  Secondly, 
even if one were to rely on the recanted statements, one could still question 
the witnesses’ basis of knowledge for their conclusion that the murder was 
committed to avenge a debt that Dickerson owed Bam.  Considering these 
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shortcomings, the prosecution in Burris may not necessarily have made its 
case by a clear and convincing standard,183 even if it did meet a simple pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard.184 
The principal concern with claiming that fact evidence establishes the 
relevancy of a gang connection to the crime in Burris is that all the fact evi-
dence in question came in the form of statements that witnesses recanted at 
trial.185  Granted, the court did admit these witnesses’ pretrial statements in-
to evidence for purposes of impeaching their contrary testimony under 
oath.186  Nevertheless, these statements fail to provide the same basis for a 
gang connection as did the sworn statements provided in Gutierrez, which 
were not recanted.187  Not only is the gang connection less reliable by virtue 
of its reliance on recanted statements, but there is no evidence that the wit-
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nesses recanted because of gang member intimidation.188  While the State 
might have established such a connection by a simple preponderance of the 
evidence, it would be difficult to say that the State established a clear and 
convincing connection between gang activity and the murder given the di-
minished weight that one would reasonably accord the recanted statements. 
Furthermore, even if the State witnesses’ pretrial statements were reli-
able, one must ask whether these statements are sufficient to tie the victim’s 
murder to BGF activity.  One witness claimed in his statement to the police 
to know that the defendant worked for Bam as a hit man, that both were 
BGF members, and to have heard Bam praise the defendant for the mur-
der.189  Again in a statement to police, another witness claimed to know that 
the victim owed Bam money.190  A third witness claimed to overhear the 
defendant say that pursuant to Bam’s instruction, he killed someone who 
owed Bam money.191  Accepting these statements at face value, they still do 
not allow the final logical connection that the murder was related to the de-
fendant’s membership in the BGF,192 but they provide evidence that could 
at least arguably meet simple preponderance standard. 
On the question of meeting the first requirement of the Gutierrez test, 
that is, establishing a gang connection to the crime for which the prosecu-
tion seeks to admit gang evidence, Burris represented a closer case than 
Gutierrez.  Without specifying a minimum standard of evidence for this 
part of the test, it is difficult to say whether or not the court was correct to 
conclude that the prosecution in Burris met its burden.  Accordingly, it will 
be difficult for defendants in future borderline cases to weigh trial strate-
gies, and for judges to make consistent decisions.  Therefore, the court 
would have established a more useful precedent if it had made such a clari-
fication. 
C.  While the Burris Court Correctly Concluded That the Potential 
Prejudice of the Contested Expert Testimony Outweighed Its 
Probative Value, It Missed an Opportunity to Add a Requirement 
That the Probative Value of Expert Testimony Be Supported by 
Relevant Fact Evidence. 
The final step in the Gutierrez analysis is to determine whether the 
probative value of the testimony given by the state’s gang expert is not 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.193  In Gutierrez, the court 
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found that because the probative value of the evidence in question out-
weighed its danger for unfair prejudice, it should be admitted.194  Under the 
facts in Burris, the court resolved the balancing test to reach the opposite 
conclusion.195  While the court was correct in doing so,196 a prosecutor who 
reads the Burris decision too narrowly could conclude that the error would 
have been prevented simply by adding more expert testimony concerning 
the prevalence of witness intimidation by gangs.  The court could have pre-
vented future unfair prejudice in this and similar cases if it had required a 
showing of fact evidence relevant to each area of gang culture to which an 
expert would testify. 
In Gutierrez, while the court did not discuss it, there was ample and 
undisputed fact evidence to support each properly admitted aspect of expert 
testimony.  The court found that the probative value gained by allowing the 
State’s expert to testify came through his explanation of the phrase “Mara 
Salvatrucha,” his description of the “jumping in” process by which one is 
initiated into a gang, and his discussion of the import in gang culture of de-
fending the gang’s honor.197  This probative value, the court said, out-
weighed any danger of unfair prejudice that might arise if jury were to draw 
a conclusion of guilt by association to a gang.198  The court also found that 
the trial court improperly admitted the expert’s statement that MS-13 was a 
particularly violent gang because this statement “[did] little to add to the ju-
ry’s understanding of why the defendant was the person who committed the 
particular crime charged.”199  The court’s ruling corresponded with a basic 
relevance requirement.200  The proposed condition that there be fact evi-
dence to tie a gang expert’s testimony to aspects of gang culture in the case 
is simply a more specific relevance requirement that would likewise have 
excluded the offending statement in Gutierrez. 
In contrast to the expert in Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals saw little to 
no probative value to be gained from the testimony of the State’s gang ex-
pert in Burris.201  This testimony did not explain what role a hit man would 
play in an alleged extortion attempt nor why gang membership would ex-
plain witness recantation, and his identification of the defendant as a BGF 
member added nothing that fact witnesses had not already said.202  Indeed, 
the court clarified that expert testimony has reduced probative value when-
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ever it simply restates conclusions already asserted by fact witnesses.203  
The court’s position corresponds with Rule 5-403’s statement that evidence 
may also be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
“needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”204  In this case, since mul-
tiple fact witnesses expressed personal knowledge that the defendant was a 
member of the gang, it added little probative value for the state’s expert to 
deduce the same conclusion.205  On the other side of the balance, the ex-
pert’s testimony carried significant possibility of unfair prejudice.206  First, 
Burris suffered the obvious risk that the jury would be more likely to con-
vict him because of his association with a gang.207  Second, multiple allu-
sions to the fact that he had spent time in jail could lead to a conviction 
based on a criminal past unrelated to the crime for which he stood trial.208  
Finally, the expert’s analysis of his tattoos invited inferences regarding his 
propensity for violence.209  Given the lack of probative value, it is not sur-
prising that the court, on balance, concluded the expert’s testimony was un-
fairly prejudicial.210 
The Court of Appeals also correctly pointed out the error in presuming 
that expert gang testimony was justified to explain why the witnesses’ tes-
timony did not match their pretrial statements or why a hit man would have 
a role in a gang’s extortion schemes.211  However, the court missed an op-
portunity to impose a requirement that the government present evidence 
that each area of gang culture about which the expert shall speak is relevant 
to the crime in question.  For example, if the expert is to discuss the phe-
nomenon of witness tampering, then the government should first present ev-
idence of witness tampering, or if the expert is to discuss how extortion by 
gangs works, then the government should first present evidence of extor-
tion.  Without such a requirement, a lower court could allow the prosecu-
tion to remedy its error simply by having its expert discuss gangs’ propensi-
ty to intimidate witnesses and to kill those who do not pay their debts, thus 
adding more unfair prejudice to the testimony.  In any case in which an ex-
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pert testifies about witness intimidation, the lack of fact evidence indicating 
actual intimidation is problematic because witnesses may revise their pretri-
al statements for other plausible reasons.  For example, a witness might 
change his testimony if the pretrial statement was inaccurate as a result of 
improper interview tactics or even coercion by police.212 While police inter-
ference with witness’s pretrial statements is not relevant under these facts, 
the courts would do well to keep such a possibility in mind in other cases 
where the government seeks to admit gang expert testimony as a means of 
explaining witness recantation. 
Just as evidence linking the crime to gang activity is necessary for the 
proper admittance of testimony by a gang expert in the first place,213 it 
makes sense that evidence tying a witness’s changed statement to gang in-
timidation should be necessary for the admittance of expert testimony on 
the subject of gang coercion of witnesses.214  Indeed, in each of the out-of-
state witness tampering cases to which the court turned for guidance in Bur-
ris, there was at least some fact evidence that gang members had actually 
threatened the witnesses.215  Similarly, before a court permits an expert to 
discuss the typical behavior of gang extortionists, the State should have to 
present some evidence that the alleged creditor considered the other party to 
owe him a debt.216  In short, if the first step of a Gutierrez analysis is to 
provide some assurance that the gang expert’s testimony will be relevant, 
then the State should also bear the burden of showing through fact evidence 
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that each area of gang culture to which the expert shall speak is relevant to 
the crime in question. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Burris court was correct in deciding that in a case where the pros-
ecution alleges without evidence that gang intimidation was responsible for 
the witnesses’ recantation of their pretrial statements, the potential for un-
fair prejudice from testimony by a gang expert outweighs the probative val-
ue of such testimony.217  However, the court should have recognized the 
importance of establishing a defendant’s gang involvement through clear 
and convincing evidence,218 specifying the correct evidentiary standard 
necessary for fact evidence to establish a connection between gang activity 
and the crime in question,219 and establishing a requirement that all areas of 
gang culture on which an expert testifies be first demonstrated through fact 
evidence.220  These three missing elements would provide necessary safe-
guards against unfair prejudice and would help ensure the kind of con-
sistency and predictability that a criminal defendant requires in order to de-
velop a trial strategy and adopt a meaningful defense. 
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